In his book, I am You, Daniel Kolak offers yet another radical theory of personal identity: There is only one person, and that person is all of us. Daniel Kolak (born in Zagreb, Croatia) is a Croatian-American philosopher who works In his groundbreaking I Am You: the Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics, he writes: “The central thesis of I Am You – that we are all the same . Pris: kr. Inbunden, Skickas inom vardagar. Köp I Am You av Daniel Kolak på

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FEC holds across both dreaming and waking experience, and yet you can and no doubt do believe that the characters with whom you interact in dreams are not other persons, while you can and no doubt do believe that the characters with whom you interact in waking life are other persons.

Much of this covers familiar ground, already explored in the literature on personal identity and in earlier Phantom Self posts. It is not incoherent. But I picked it up again a few weeks later, because I knew Kolak sincerely believed he was on to something, and I wanted to see if I could make sense of it.

I Am You by Kolak, Daniel

Returns are shipped at the customer’s risk. By my analysis, we are each a different human being.

That includes all theories of persons as substantial entities, whether biological organisms, or important parts of the human anatomy such as brains or hemispheres, or immaterial substances such as the soul.

For twenty years he inhabited that guided and directed hallucination, but one morning he was overwhelmed with the surfeit and horror of being so many kings that die by the sword and so many unrequited lovers who come together, separate, and melodiously expire. Adventures in the Margin of ErrorHarperCollins.

An Epistemological Assessment and a Metaphysical Theory.

Common senile dementia will do as a test case. I believe I am person p just in case I have self-concern for person p. Just yesterday I was talking with my mom about how much pleasure that path made me, because she asked why I liked so much doing things like that here and at my home in New York, rather than hiring somebody my wife wants to know the same thing, not to mention my lazy kids. The latter group includes people who do not exist.


Daniel Kolak

Parfit rightly, I say holds that the continued existence of physical organs, such as whole brains or hemispheres, is not essential to survival of persons. Retrieved 23 July This is like my situation in the Branch-Line Case. Bloggat om I Am You.

Hence, to feel the emotional koalk for that future person that one normally has for oneself in the future is inappropriate. The traditional, commonsense raniel that we are each a separate person numerically identical to ourselves over time, i. Persons and Psychological Frameworks: When I talk to my Replica on Mars, this is merely like the communication in the Physics Exam between myself in my two streams.

Carter – – Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 1: Among his best known recent works are I Am You: Cogito, Ergo Quis Est?. Andrew – – Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 13 1: Mail will not be published required.

I Am You: A Philosophical Explanation of the Possibility That We Are All the Same Person

When I was preparing my doctoral dissertation, on which the book I Am You is based, my mentor and friend Ray Martin chastized me for speaking in the introduction about a mystical experience that by definition cannot be described or referred to which I was now referring to and going to describe differently. Ray thought the philosophers on my committee and others down the line would jump all over me on that one. There is a tree on a hill there with a little wooden bench where you can sit and see nothing of the world civilization has built, and feel connected in some primordial way to nature.


Since Parfit can take this view of the Branch-Line Case, in which the life of one branch is expected to be short, why, Kolak wonders, does he not take a similar view of fission cases where each branch goes on to live for years?

Estimated delivery business days. The Scope and Import of Hintikka’s Philosophy p. Persons in Metaphysics categorize this kklak. If person A splits into person B and person C, both of whom are well connected with the original person A, then—as soon as B and C are clearly established as independent entities, each leading his or her own life—we should conclude that B is not the same person as C, and hence, since both B and C have essentially the same relationship to A, neither of them are the same person as A.

In this book I explain how this is possible.

His development of the implied moral theory is inspired by, and draws on, Rawls, Sidgwick, Kant and again Parfit. Please view eBay estimated delivery times at the top of the listing. He contrasts it to two other main positions on personal identity: Since Parfit holds that what matters in survival consists in psychological continuity and connectedness, it seems he should agree that a catastrophic psychological disruption involving, say, near-total memory loss and radical personality change, is tantamount to death.

Now, I cut that path a few years ago, took out the shrubs and trees as needed, and it leads as I say from one end of our property, which starts on Saddle Club Road, to the other, which now opens up a cul-de-sac that forms the end of a different street.

Kolak uses a similar move to counter the objection that other people have separate mental lives.